NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0080n.06 Case No. 19-4025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Feb 23, 2022 ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk RAMON JASSO ARANGURE, ) Petitioner, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW v. ) FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) APPEALS Respondent. ) ) BEFORE: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. The court delivered a PER CURIAM opinion. THAPAR, J. (pp. 13–16), delivered a separate concurring opinion. PER CURIAM. Ramon Jasso Arangure lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident. After he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. But the removal didn’t go as planned: DHS failed to show that Jasso was in fact removable, and the immigration judge terminated the proceeding. So DHS tried again. It started a second removal proceeding based on a new legal theory but the same underlying facts. The problem? The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters they failed to raise in an earlier case. Because claim preclusion barred the second removal proceeding, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand. Case No. 19-4025, Jasso Arangure v. Garland I. Ramon Jasso Arangure is a native and citizen of Mexico. He married a United States citizen and became a lawful permanent resident in 2003. Eleven years later, Jasso pled guilty to first-degree home invasion.1 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(2) (1999). Shortly after, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. It argued that Jasso was removable for committing an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Specifically, DHS argued that Jasso had committed a “crime of violence.” See id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining aggravated felonies to include crimes of violence). The statute defines a crime of violence in two ways: (1) through an elements clause, and (2) through a residual clause. 18 U.S.C. § 16. The immigration judge held that Jasso was removable under the residual clause. But while Jasso’s appeal was pending, we determined that the residual clause is unconstitutional. Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 451 (6th Cir. 2016). So the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for the immigration judge to consider if Jasso was removable under the elements clause. The immigration judge held that Jasso’s conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under that clause. As a result, he concluded the charge that Jasso had committed an aggravated felony was “not sustained” and terminated the proceeding. Undeterred, DHS tried a different tack: It opened a second removal proceeding and argued that Jasso was instead removable for committing a “burglary offense.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining aggravated felonies to include burglary offenses). Jasso argued that claim preclusion barred the second proceeding, but the immigration judge and the BIA disagreed. Both held that claim preclusion does not apply to removal proceedings. 1 Ramon Jasso Arangure refers to himself as “Jasso,” so we follow suit. -2- Case No. 19-4025, Jasso Arangure v. Garland …
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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals