17-2907 Rana v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of September, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ RANJIT RANA, Petitioner, v. No. 17-2907-ag WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, New York, New York. FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director; Anthony J. Messuri, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision is DENIED. Petitioner Ranjit Rana, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a BIA decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Ranjit Rana, No. A206 296 708 (B.I.A. Aug. 28, 2017), aff’g No. A206 296 708 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 31, 2016). Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. The challenged agency denial was based on its finding that Rana had not credibly demonstrated past persecution. We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that substantial evidence standard “requires that . . . factual findings be based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). Under the governing standard, a trier of fact, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, . . . may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the ...
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