Randhawa v. Department of Homeland Security


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VRINDER SINGH RANDHAWA et al., Plaintiffs, v. No. 20-cv-3200 (DLF) DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY et al., Defendants. ORDER Vrinder Singh Randhawa alleges that the Department of Homeland Security mistreated him during his immigration proceedings. His core allegation is that the agency unreasonably delayed in granting his applications for employment authorization and travel documents, thereby preventing him from visiting his ill and now-deceased father. See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 9, 16, Dkt. 1; Compl. Ex. G, Dkt. 1-1. He also alleges that Department officials treated him in a “belligerent and unhelpful” manner. Compl. ¶ 12. In this action, Randhawa seeks money damages from the Department pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which waives federal sovereign immunity in “circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Id. § 1346(b)(1). To support that claim, he argues that Department is liable for both several constitutional torts, see Compl. ¶ 43, and the wrongful death of his father, id. ¶ 28. Before this Court are the Department’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 19; Randhawa’s motions to add new plaintiffs, Dkt. 13, add new claims, Dkt. 14, and require document production, Dkt. 15; and Randhawa’s motion for a default judgment, Dkt. 12. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the Department’s motion and deny Randhawa’s motions. Before addressing the merits of any plaintiff’s claim, this Court must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Federal district courts may hear only certain kinds of cases, and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, see Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and courts must raise obstacles to their jurisdiction sua sponte, see Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019). A court that lacks jurisdiction must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3). Here, this Court lacks jurisdiction because Randhawa sued the wrong defendant. “The United States of America is the only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA.” Chandler v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 226 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 125 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff may not bring tort claims against federal officials in their official capacities or against federal agencies; the proper defendant is the United States itself[.]”); see also 28 U.S.C. …

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