(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus REHAIF v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 17–9560. Argued April 23, 2019—Decided June 21, 2019 Petitioner Rehaif entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa to attend university but was dismissed for poor grades. He sub- sequently shot two firearms at a firing range. The Government pros- ecuted him under 18 U. S. C. §922(g), which makes it unlawful for certain persons, including aliens illegally in the country, to possess firearms, and §924(a)(2), which provides that anyone who “knowingly violates” the first provision can be imprisoned for up to 10 years. The jury at Rehaif’s trial was instructed that the Government was not re- quired to prove that he knew that he was unlawfully in the country. It returned a guilty verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Held: In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. Pp. 3–12. (a) Whether a criminal statute requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly is a question of congressional in- tent. This inquiry starts from a longstanding presumption that Con- gress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding “each of the statutory elements that criminalize oth- erwise innocent conduct,” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 72, normally characterized as a presumption in favor of “sci- enter.” There is no convincing reason to depart from this presump- tion here. The statutory text supports the presumption. It specifies that a de- fendant commits a crime if he “knowingly” violates §922(g), which makes possession of a firearm unlawful when the following elements are satisfied: (1) a status element (here “being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the United States”); (2) a possession element (to “pos- 2 REHAIF v. UNITED STATES Syllabus sess”); (3) a jurisdictional element (“in or affecting commerce”); and (4) a firearm element (a “firearm or ammunition”). Aside from the ju- risdictional element, which is not subject to the presumption in favor of scienter, §922(g)’s text simply lists the elements that make a de- fendant’s behavior criminal. The term “knowingly” is normally read “as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U. S. 646, 650. And the “know- ingly” requirement clearly applies to §922(g)’s possession element, which follows the status element in ...
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