Jeanette Reyes v. State of Maryland No. 1092, Sept. Term, 2020 Opinion by Leahy, J. Criminal Law > Postconviction Relief > Writ of Error Coram Nobis > Defenses > Laches In addition to showing an unreasonable delay, a party asserting laches must show prejudice resulting from the delay. Jones v. State, 445 Md. 324, 329 (2015); Fludd v. Kirkwood, ___ Md. App. ___, No. 1297, September Term 2020, at slip op. 14 (filed Dec. 16, 2021); Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 610 (2019). Here, the State did not assert any form of prejudice in its answer to the coram nobis petition. Then, during the coram nobis hearing, the State conceded, multiple times on the record, that it suffered no prejudice from the delay. Accordingly, we hold that the State has waived its defense of laches. Criminal Law > Postconviction Relief > Writ of Error Coram Nobis > Equitable Factors The failure to seek a direct appeal has limited relevance to the coram nobis analysis. Since the General Assembly enacted Maryland Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article, § 8-401, it has been the law of our State that a petitioner does not waive her right to coram nobis relief by failing to seek a direct appeal. We conclude that the circuit court was incorrect to consider Ms. Reyes’s failure to seek a direct appeal as a factor in its analysis because doing so is incompatible with the public policy expressed by the General Assembly in CP § 8-401. Criminal Law > Postconviction Relief > Writ of Error Coram Nobis > Equitable Factors We do not think that the amount of time elapsed between Ms. Reyes’s conviction and her coram nobis petition was a proper factor for the circuit court to consider in its coram nobis analysis. Because the State conceded that it suffered no prejudice from Ms. Reyes’s delay in bringing her petition, the delay had limited relevance—if any—to a weighing of the equities of this case. Criminal Law > Guilty Pleas > Knowledge of Maximum Sentence While the State is correct that Coleman v. State, 219 Md. App. 339 (2014), considered the petitioner’s actual sentence as a factor in its decision, it played a relatively small role in our analysis. The dispositive factor in Coleman was that even though the petitioner was not properly informed of the maximum sentence at his plea hearing, he had actual knowledge of the true maximum sentence before he pleaded guilty. Id. at 357. Criminal Law > Guilty Pleas > Knowledge of Maximum Sentence We are presented with facts very different from those of Coleman v. State, 219 Md. App. 339 (2014). From the outset of Ms. Reyes’s criminal case, she was repeatedly told that she faced a maximum sentence that was only one quarter of the actual maximum sentence. The representations of the parties at the sentencing hearing make it clear that this misunderstanding persisted throughout the entire case until after Ms. Reyes pleaded guilty, and …
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