J-S03017-23 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 GERISKA THAMARA RIBEIRO ARRAIS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MARCONIO SALES SOUSA : No. 2518 EDA 2022 Appeal from the Order Entered September 7, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2022-04169-CU BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J. CONCURRING STATEMENT BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2023 The learned majority thoroughly and persuasively explains its holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider a request for findings related to the subject child’s status as a special immigrant juvenile (“SIJ”). This Court’s precedent compels me to agree that the trial court erred in suggesting that it lacked jurisdiction to make such findings. See Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2022). However, I write separately based on my view that the SIJ statute, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J), presents unique problems, which, without further guidance from our Supreme Court and General Assembly, will continue to challenge our orphans’, juvenile, and family courts. The SIJ statute and the implementing regulations are remarkable insofar as they enlist state courts as part of the immigration process and delegate to those courts’ findings that, inter alia: reunification with one or both of the J-S03017-23 child’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and it would not be in the child’s best interests to return to a foreign country of origin or last habitual residence. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)-(c). Although a state court does not make an ultimate immigration decision, state courts are an integral part of the SIJ status proceedings. See Orozco, 284 A.3d at 477. This hybrid approach of engrafting federal immigration law unto state law rests on a presumption that state courts have special competence when addressing abandonment, neglect, and abuse and determining a child’s best interests. See In re J.J.X.C., 734 S.E.2d 120, 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Pennsylvania courts have only recently addressed the SIJ statute in published decisions in Orozco and Velasquez v. Miranda, --- A.3d ---, 2023 PA Super 111, 2023 WL 4069151 (Pa. Super. 2023).1 The SIJ statute is not new, however, and other state courts’ interpretations and applications of the statute have resulted in inconsistent decisions.2 ____________________________________________ 1A petition for reargument in Velazquez is currently pending before this Court. 2 Congress enacted the first SIJ statute in 1990 and amended it in 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2005. The earlier iterations of the statute appear to have been limited to cases where a child’s parents brought a child to the United States, but the child became eligible for long-term foster care. See Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the original SIJ statute provided an alternative to deporting a child along with abusive parents or deporting a child to parents who abandoned the child once in the United …
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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals