NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RICARDO DAVILA-RABANAL, No. 19-71872 Petitioner, Agency No. A073-841-949 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 1, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: GRABER, MILLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Ricardo Davila-Rabanal seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order affirming the denial of his Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review. 1. We review the denial of CAT protection for substantial evidence. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, we must “uphold the agency’s determination unless compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. 2. The Peruvian police’s treatment of Davila-Rabanal—while brutal—did not rise to the level of torture. He described his injuries as “bruises” with some “minor cuts,” and his worst injury was a cut across his forehead. Although the police pointed a gun at Davila-Rabanal and hit him with it, the record contains no evidence that the gun was loaded or that the officers ever threatened to kill him. To the contrary, in response to a question from the immigration judge, Davila-Rabanal clarified that the police did not threaten to kill him. We have held that such treatment is a lesser form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment that does not amount to torture. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2007); Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013). Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA's determination that Davila-Rabanal has not suffered past torture. 3. Substantial evidence also supports the determination that Davila- Rabanal’s ability to live in Peru for three years without incident undermines his claim of fear of future torture. Davila-Rabanal lived a normal life in Peru. He held a job, acquired housing, traveled throughout the city, and even obtained a passport from the Peruvian government. 2 4. The evidence of country conditions does not overcome the deficiencies in Davila-Rabanal’s testimony. The country conditions evidence does not paint a picture of widespread torture such that “the country conditions alone [] play[s] a decisive role in granting relief . . . .” Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001). 5. Davila-Rabanal makes several arguments that the BIA erred in its torture analysis, but none of them has merit. First, he argues that the BIA erred in finding that the government had not acquiesced in his torture. But the BIA never …
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