In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 18-1478 RICKEY I. KANTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019 ____________________ Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel- ony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un- der both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is whether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second Amendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring 2 No. 18-1478 an as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub- stantially related to an important government interest. We therefore affirm the district court. I. Background A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean- ors are included under the statute if they are punishable by more than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However, the statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac- tices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A). Moreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute. Id. § 921(a)(20). Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for life, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ- uals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their firearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is somewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral Damage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford- ham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018). No. 18-1478 3 (2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the prohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently establishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred the Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in- vestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro- vision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on Appropriations eliminated funding because the restoration procedure ...
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