Sanchez v. Bezos


Filed 6/30/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE MICHAEL SANCHEZ, B309364, B312143 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV04212) v. JEFFREY PRESTON BEZOS et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John P. Doyle, Judge. Affirmed. Warren Terzian, Thomas D. Warren and Erick Kuylman for Plaintiff and Appellant. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Meredith R. Dearborn, William A. Isaacson and Julia Tarver Mason Wood for Defendants and Respondents. ____________________________ This appeal arises from a defamation action filed by plaintiff Michael Sanchez against defendants Jeffrey Preston Bezos and Gavin de Becker. Plaintiff alleged that defendants falsely told several reporters that plaintiff had provided explicit nude photographs of Bezos to the National Enquirer (the Enquirer) as part of a conspiracy to damage Bezos. Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. To demonstrate the merits of his case, plaintiff offered his own declaration asserting that numerous reporters had informed him of defendants’ accusations against him. The trial court found the reporters’ statements recounted in plaintiff’s declaration were inadmissible hearsay, and therefore could not be considered for anti-SLAPP purposes. Because plaintiff offered no other evidence that defendants made defamatory comments about him, the court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues his evidence of defendants’ purported defamatory statements was not hearsay because he did not offer the statements for the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to establish the statements were uttered. Second, plaintiff argues that under Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931 (Sweetwater), hearsay may be considered for anti-SLAPP purposes if there is a reasonable possibility the hearsay will be cured at trial. Plaintiff contends any hearsay in 1Unspecified statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 his declaration can be cured when the reporters testify under oath in deposition or at trial. We reject these arguments. Had plaintiff himself witnessed defendants make defamatory comments, he could testify to those comments without running afoul of the hearsay rule. In that event, he would offer the evidence not for the truth of the matter asserted but to establish the comments were made. Here, however, plaintiff’s declaration recounted not what he himself had witnessed, but what reporters told him they had witnessed. The reporters’ statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, namely that the reporters heard defendants make defamatory comments about plaintiff. The reporters’ statements therefore are hearsay. Plaintiff misreads Sweetwater. That case reaffirmed that hearsay, absent an applicable exception, may not be considered for anti-SLAPP purposes. The only examples of “curable” hearsay in that decision were statements made under oath or penalty of perjury. Those statements by analogy fell within the hearsay exception …

Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals