NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 26 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SANDOR MAURICIO TOBAR- No. 18-73158 RAMIREZ, Agency No. A202-081-073 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 1, 2021**1F P Pasadena, California Before: SILER,*** HURWITZ, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Sandor Tobar-Ramirez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of two decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeals from the decisions of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Reviewing the BIA’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence,” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted), we deny the petition in part and grant it in part. 1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Tobar failed to establish a nexus between any past or feared future persecution and an imputed political opinion. Tobar testified that he was neither politically active nor a member of any political party, and proffered no evidence that gang members or police officers targeted him for political reasons. The BIA was not required to infer political motive by his alleged persecutors. See Singh v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1153, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2014). 2. Before the agency, Tobar also argued that he was persecuted on account of his membership in two particular social groups (“PSGs”): (1) “individuals who are persecuted by gang members who threaten them with death and force them to relocate from their domicile”; and (2) “abandoned children who have been targets of gangs, and government cannot protect them.” The BIA found neither PSG 2 cognizable because both were “based solely and circularly on the shared experience of persecution.” The BIA’s rejection of the first PSG is consistent with our precedent, as that group was “defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected to harm.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In his opening brief, Tobar emphasizes that his first PSG concerns individuals with domiciles in territory controlled by a particular gang. But, because Tobar did not advance this definition of the PSG before the BIA, we may not consider it. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). And, because Tobar does not otherwise contest that, as defined below, his first PSG is impermissibly circular, he has forfeited any challenge to that determination. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 …
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