NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 19-1845 ____________ SANTOS GUILLEN-URQUILLA a/k/a Santos Gullian, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent ____________ On Petition for Review from an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board No. A077-444-729) Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington ____________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) December 12, 2019 Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: May 4, 2020) ____________ OPINION * ____________ FISHER, Circuit Judge. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Santos Guillen-Urquilla, a Salvadoran citizen, entered the United States in 1998. Although ordered removed soon after his arrival, he stayed in the United States. He was removed to El Salvador in 2007 but reentered the United States after two months. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his prior removal order. In 2018, Guillen-Urquilla applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Guillen-Urquilla petitions for review. We will deny his petition. 1 Guillen-Urquilla argues that the IJ and BIA failed to adequately analyze his claim for withholding of removal. 2 The agency held that Guillen-Urquilla was ineligible for such relief because he did not show a nexus between any of his proffered protected grounds and his alleged persecution, the past harm he suffered does not rise to the level 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s opinion and “consider the IJ’s opinion where the [BIA] adopted or deferred to the IJ’s reasoning.” Radiowala v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 577, 581 (3d Cir. 2019). Factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence—that is, they “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 2 A noncitizen may not be removed if he demonstrates that it is more likely than not “that [his] life or freedom would be threatened” on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To meet this standard, he can show that he was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in which case there is a presumption that he will face future persecution; or he can show that he fears future persecution on account of a protected ground regardless of any past harm. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). He must also establish that he was persecuted by “forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006)). 2 of persecution, he failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, and there was insufficient evidence that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control his alleged persecutors. Guillen-Urquilla challenges certain of these determinations, but they are supported by substantial evidence. Guillen-Urquilla primarily argues that the IJ ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals