In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 17-1579 & 17-2852 SARBJIT SINGH, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petitions for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A075-456-846 ____________________ ARGUED JANUARY 3, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2018 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN, District Judge. ∗ SYKES, Circuit Judge. Sarbjit Singh, an Indian citizen and lawful permanent resident, faces removal from the United ∗ Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 2 Nos. 17-1579 & 17-2852 States for the second time. 1 He was first removed in 2006 based on a 2004 Indiana felony conviction for corrupt busi- ness influence. IND. CODE § 35-45-6-2. Singh reentered the country in 2010 to pursue postconviction relief in Indiana. Three weeks later a state judge vacated the conviction and accepted his guilty plea to the crime of deception (a misde- meanor) in its stead. Id. § 35-43-5-3. Singh thereafter asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen and reconsider the removal order. The Board granted the motion and remanded the case to an immigration judge. A second round of removal proceedings ensued. The government initially conceded that the deception offense did not support removal and sought Singh’s removal on other grounds. It later changed course and issued a new charge alleging that Singh was removable based on the deception conviction, which it argued was “a crime involving moral turpitude … for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Singh responded that the government’s initial concession was binding and, regardless, deception is not a removable offense because it is not punishable by a sentence of “one year or longer.” The immigration judge entered a new removal order, reasoning that the government’s concession was not binding because the Department of Homeland Security has express regulatory authority to lodge new or additional charges in removal proceedings “[a]t any time.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.30, 1240.10(e). And because the deception offense carries a 1 The petitioner’s first name is spelled “Sarabjit” in recent filings before the agency and this court. We use “Sarbjit” to remain consistent with the Board’s orders. Nos. 17-1579 & 17-2852 3 possible sentence of “not more than one (1) year,” IND. CODE § 35-50-3-2, the judge held that it qualifies as a crime for which a sentence of “one year or longer may be imposed.” The Board affirmed the removal order. Meanwhile, Singh went back to state court and entered into an agreement with the prosecutor to vacate the decep- tion conviction in exchange for a guilty plea to a misde- meanor offense of dealing in drug paraphernalia. The state judge accepted the deal, and Singh returned to the Board with a motion to reopen and reconsider the second removal order. Like before, he notified the Board that the state court had vacated the conviction that served as the predicate for ...
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