NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 20-1761 SAT PAUL VERMA, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A090-577-689) Immigration Judge: Kelley Fowler Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 11, 2021 Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 27, 2021) ____________ OPINION * ____________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, Sat Verma, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States without proper inspection in 1982 and became a legal permanent resident in 1990. In 2013, he pled guilty to access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5) due to his role in conducting and facilitating sham transactions using fraudulent credit cards and merchant accounts at his jewelry store. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey convicted and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The Government charged Verma as removable for this conviction, which it argues is an aggravated felony that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (“(M)(i)”), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One immigration judge (“IJ”) agreed Verma indeed committed an aggravated felony, and another denied his application for adjustment of status and waivers of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) dismissed Verma’s appeal. In his petition for review to us, Verma argues he did not commit an aggravated felony because the Government failed to prove losses to victims exceeding $10,000. He also challenges the discretionary denial of his application for adjustment of status. I. We exercise plenary review over the BIA’s determination that Verma committed an aggravated felony under (M)(i). See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012). In determining whether an offense meets the statutory loss requirement under that provision, we employ a “circumstance-specific” approach, examining “the specific way 2 in which [the noncitizen] committed the crime on a specific occasion.” Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 36 (2009). We are permitted to consider the presentence investigation report and any “sentencing-related material” so long as the noncitizen has been given “a fair opportunity to challenge the Government’s claim.” Fan Wang v. Att’y Gen., 898 F.3d 341, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Verma does not dispute his offense involves the requisite “fraud or deceit” under (M)(i), though he argues that a charge under it cannot be supported when the victims are not identified. But this misstates the law. As we recently explained in Rad v. Attorney General, 983 F.3d 651, 669 (3d Cir. 2020), the Government “can establish the loss element without specifically identifying a victim or victims; all the statutory text requires is that victims exist, and that they have collectively lost over $10,000.” ...
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