Sidi Njie v. Merrick B. Garland


NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 21a0453n.06 No. 21-3065 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Oct 06, 2021 SIDI MUHAMMAD NJIE, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Petitioner, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW v. ) FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) APPEALS ) Respondent. ) ) BEFORE: ROGERS, GRIFFIN, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Sidi Muhammad Njie petitions this court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reconsider its prior order dismissing his appeal from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal and denying his motion to remand. As set forth below, we DENY the petition for review. Njie, a native and citizen of The Gambia, entered the United States in October 2002 as a non-immigrant visitor with authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed six months. He did not leave the country when that temporary period expired. In April 2017, the Department of Homeland Security served Njie with a notice to appear in removal proceedings, charging him with removability as an alien who had remained in the United States for longer than permitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). When he appeared before an immigration judge (IJ), Njie admitted the factual allegations set forth in the notice to appear and conceded removability as charged. No. 21-3065, Njie v. Garland Njie filed an application for cancellation of removal, asserting that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his spouse and children, all United States citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). At the merits hearing, Njie and his current wife testified in support of his application. Following the hearing, the IJ issued a written decision denying Njie’s application but granting him voluntary departure. The IJ found that Njie had failed to establish his statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal because he had failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate that he had been a person of good moral character for the ten years preceding his application. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). The IJ based this determination on a 2013 interview with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) during which Njie and his former wife, Denise Flynn, made discrepant statements under oath relating to whether their marriage was bona fide. See id. § 1101(f)(6) (“No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established is . . . one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter.”). Njie filed an appeal to the BIA and, while that appeal was pending, a motion to remand to the IJ based on new evidence—Flynn’s new affidavit attesting to the bona fide nature of their marriage. The BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that the IJ’s finding that Njie gave false testimony was not clearly erroneous. The BIA …

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