NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 19-3063 _______________ SIMEON ANTONIO SPENCE, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (A037-330-231) Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington _______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 18, 2020 Before: McKEE, BIBAS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges (Filed: October 1, 2020) _______________ OPINION* _______________ BIBAS, Circuit Judge. Simeon Spence was born out of wedlock in Jamaica in early 1979. Later that year, his parents married. Around the same time, his father immigrated to the United States. After * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. his father petitioned on their behalf, Spence and his mother entered the country in 1981 as lawful permanent residents. Though his mother became a U.S. citizen in 1989, his father never naturalized. In 2011, Spence was convicted of cocaine trafficking and conspiracy. Because those are aggravated felonies as well as drug crimes, the government sought to remove him. Before the immigration court, Spence conceded that he was removable unless he was a U.S. citizen. But he argued that he was a citizen, because his mother had naturalized. On that ground, he moved to terminate his removal proceeding. The immigration court denied Spence’s motion. The immigration judge found that his parents’ marriage legitimated him and established paternity under Jamaican law, prevent- ing him from gaining citizenship under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) (repealed 2000). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the citizenship ruling. Spence now petitions for review of that ruling. We have jurisdiction and review his citizenship claim de novo. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A); Dessouki v. Att’y Gen., 915 F.3d 964, 966–67 (3d Cir. 2019). We look to the law as it stood at his birth in 1979 and at his mother’s naturalization in 1989. Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2005). In 1989, the citizenship of a child born abroad was governed by former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a). Spence does not claim citizenship under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or the first half of (a)(3). Rather, he invokes the second half of (a)(3), claiming that he gained citizenship by “the naturalization of the mother” because “the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation.” § 1432(a)(3). Everyone 2 agrees that Spence’s mother naturalized when he was ten and that he was born out of wed- lock. So the key question is whether “the paternity of [Spence] has not been established by legitimation.” Id. For that question, we look to the domestic-relations laws of Jamaica. See Brandao v. Att’y Gen., 654 F.3d 427, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2011) (deciding the legitimacy of a child born in Cape Verde based on that country’s laws); see also Morgan, 432 F.3d at 232. In Jamaica, his parents’ marriage in 1979 legitimated Spence. Under section 2 of the Legitimation Act ...
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