Singh v. Barr


16-4302 Singh v. Barr BIA Segal, IJ A200 282 159 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of March, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ GUPREET SINGH, Petitioner, v. 16-4302 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director; Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED. Petitioner Gupreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a December 2, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a January 5, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gupreet Singh, No. A 200 282 159 (B.I.A. Dec. 2, 2016), aff’g No. A 200 282 159 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 5, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2010). To show eligibility for asylum, an applicant must establish past persecution or a well- founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Here, because the IJ concluded that Singh established past persecution, he was entitled to a presumption of “a well- founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). It is the government’s burden to overcome that presumption, which it can do by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that “the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality ...

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