NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0851-19T1 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOWARD L. DUNNS, a/k/a HOWARD LAMONT DUNNS, CLARENECE DUNNS, MICHAEL HOARN, ROBERT JONESY, LAMONT NEWPORT, and ROBERT JONES, Defendant-Respondent. _______________________________ Argued January 13, 2020 – Decided March 9, 2020 Before Judges Messano, Vernoia and Susswein. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment Nos. 13-08-2321 and 13-09-2433. Marisa McGarvey, Assistant County Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Marisa McGarvey, of counsel and on the brief). Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alison Gifford, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant, Howard L. Dunns, was charged in several indictments with numerous crimes alleged to have been committed in two different counties. The State and defendant negotiated two plea agreements, entered on different dates, to resolve the multitude of charges. Defendant recently exercised his right to withdraw from the first plea agreement after he successfully appealed from the trial court's denial of a severance motion. The State seeks to vacate the second plea agreement, arguing that the two agreements were intended to be part of a unified, global resolution of all charges pending against defendant. The State argues, for example, that it would not have extended the leniency afforded in the second plea agreement but for the significant prison term imposed pursuant to the first agreement. The trial court denied the State's motion to vacate the second agreement, ruling that the two agreements are separate and not contingent on each other. The trial court further held the State has no right to withdraw from the secon d agreement, especially since defendant has already served the sentences imposed A-0851-19T1 2 under that agreement. We granted the State leave to appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate the second agreement. We have reviewed the record in view of the parties' arguments and applicable legal principles and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion to vacate the second plea agreement. Our review of the record accords with the trial court's finding that the record is silent as to whether the two plea agreements were intended to be treated as a single, unified, and indivisible resolution of pending charges. Notably, the second agreement, unlike the first one, was not a conditional agreement; the prosecutor did not expressly reserve the right to withdraw from the second agreement in the event defendant prevailed on the appeal he preserved through the conditional plea agreement. In the absence of a clear indication in the ...
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