Affirmed; Opinion Filed; October 2, 2019 In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-18-00870-CR No. 05-18-00871-CR No. 05-18-00872-CR THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. KEVIN CASTANEDANIETO, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F17-57212-X, F17-57213-X & F18-00407-X MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Carlyle The State appeals the trial court’s order suppressing appellee Kevin Castanedanieto’s statement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1 The law We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and apply a bifurcated standard of review. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); State v. Aguilar, 535 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, giving almost complete deference 1 Though the State’s sole issue on appeal is multifarious, we consider it and the differing legal bases the State offers in support. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9; cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (i). to the court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially those based on credibility or demeanor assessments.2 Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We review with this deference even in cases involving video evidence. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). That is because our system does not require parties to “concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge” only to start over on appeal, treating the trial proceedings as a “tryout,” and requiring parties to “persuade three more judges at the appellate level.” Id. (citing and quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985)).3 We afford that same deference regarding the trial court’s “application of law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48. For a mixed question of law and fact that does not depend on credibility or demeanor evaluation, we “may conduct” de novo review. Id. “The winning side is afforded the ‘strongest legitimate view of the evidence’ as well as all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it.” Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 571 & n.23 (citing 2 We note that, because the court granted suppression, it was not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and we need not remand for the court to take that action. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 6 (“In all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the court must make an independent finding . . . as to whether the statement was made under voluntary conditions.”); see also State v. Perez, No. 14-16-00690-CR, 2017 WL 5505855, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston ...
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