State v. Madden

[Cite as State v. Madden, 2022-Ohio-2638.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-210537 TRIAL NO. B-2100164 Plaintiff-Appellant, : vs. : O P I N I O N. KEAJZUAN MADDEN, : Defendant-Appellee. : Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 3, 2022 Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant, The Law Office of John D. Hill and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS WINKLER, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-appellee Keajzuan Madden was indicted for aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with two firearm specifications. The trial court granted his motion to suppress his statements to the police. The state has appealed that decision under R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(K). We find no merit in the state’s assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. {¶2} In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court erred in granting Madden’s motion to suppress. It argues that after invoking his right to counsel, Madden waived that right by initiating further communication with the police. This assignment of error is not well taken. {¶3} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact as true if competent, credible evidence supports them. But we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Richardson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C- 200187, 2021-Ohio-2751, ¶ 13. {¶4} A suspect who has “expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The police may not reinitiate an interrogation under the guise of a generalized discussion about the investigation. State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 259, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988); State v. Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-060631 and C-060668, 2007-Ohio-5577, ¶ 34. The suspect 2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS himself must initiate dialogue with the authorities and must knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Van Hook at 259; Williams at ¶ 34. {¶5} The United States Supreme Court has established this rule as a “bright- line test” for dealing with defendants who invoke their right to counsel. “Simply stated, if a defendant requests counsel, the police must stop all questioning and interrogation immediately.” State v. Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d 494, 495, 605 N.E.2d 54 …

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