FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 8, 2021 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ELVIA TENEZACA-DUTAN, Petitioner, v. No. 20-9586 (Petition for Review) MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondent. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * * _________________________________ Before HARTZ, BRISCOE, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ In this petition for review, we consider what constitutes a material change in country conditions. The issue arises from Ms. Elvia After the filing of the petition for review, Merrick B. Garland became the Attorney General of the United States. So we have substituted Attorney General Garland as the respondent. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). ** We conclude that oral argument would not materially help us to decide the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). So we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Tenezaca-Dutan’s application for reconsideration of the denial of a motion to reopen. Reopening may be available to noncitizens after they unsuccessfully seek asylum or reconsideration. But a motion to reopen is ordinarily due 90 days from the date of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Ms. Tenezaca-Dutan missed the 90-day deadline by over a decade: The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered her removal in 2008, and she waited until 2019 to seek reopening. But federal law excuses satisfaction of the 90-day deadline upon proof of a material change in country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Invoking this law, Ms. Tenezaca-Dutan moved for reopening based on changes taking place in Ecuador. The immigration judge denied the motion and a request to reconsider this ruling. The Board dismissed her appeal of the ruling on her motion to reconsider. Ms. Tenezaca-Dutan petitions for judicial review, arguing that the Board failed to explain its reasoning and lacked substantial evidence for its findings. We reject these arguments. I. The Board adequately explained its reasons for denying reconsideration. In part, Ms. Tenezaca-Dutan contends that the Board (1) ignored her evidence of a surge in Ecuadorian femicides, (2) deferred to the 2 immigration judge rather than reweigh the evidence, and (3) failed to explain why it did not regard the increase in femicides as a material change in country conditions. First, Ms. Tenezaca-Dutan identifies no evidence that the Board ignored. The Board need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. See Hadjimehdigholi v. I.N.S., 49 F.3d 642, 648 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). And the Board specifically addressed the evidence of an increase in femicides in 2017. Admin. R. at 4. Second, the Board did not err by failing to reweigh the evidence. Rather, …
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals