NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 24 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TERRENCE BRESSI, No. 22-15123 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00186-DCB v. MEMORANDUM* PIMA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; MARK NAPIER, Former Pima County Sheriff, in his individual capacity; CHRISTOPHER NANOS, Pima County Sheriff, in his official capacity; RYAN ROHER, Pima County Deputy Sheriff, in his individual capacity; BRIAN KUNZE, Pima County Deputy Sheriff, in his individual capacity; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL; ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, Secretary, DHS; CHRIS MAGNUS, Commissioner, CBP; RAUL L. ORTIZ; JOHN R. MODLIN; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Argued and Submitted February 7, 2023 Phoenix, Arizona Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Terrence Bressi appeals the adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that the Border Patrol’s operation of a checkpoint on State Route 86 in Southern Arizona (the “SR-86 checkpoint”) violates the Fourth Amendment and that he has been falsely arrested and routinely retaliated against for protesting the checkpoint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018), and may affirm on any basis supported by the record, In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999). We affirm. 1. To prevail on his claim that the SR-86 checkpoint violates the Fourth Amendment, Bressi must demonstrate that the checkpoint has an impermissible primary purpose or that the checkpoint’s operation is unreasonable. See Demarest v. City of Vallejo, 44 F.4th 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2022). Defendants put forth evidence that the SR-86 checkpoint is an immigration checkpoint that operates within the parameters approved by the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Bressi’s video recordings of his interactions at the checkpoint also depict agents routinely identifying the checkpoint as an “immigration checkpoint” and limiting their encounters to a few immigration-related questions and open-view inspections of the passing vehicles. Contrary to Bressi’s 2 contention, the evidence on which he relies tends to show, at most, that the checkpoint has a secondary purpose of illegal-narcotics interdiction, which is insufficient to raise a triable issue as to the permissibility of the checkpoint’s clear primary purpose of immigration enforcement. Demarest, 44 F.4th at 1220; United States v. Soto-Camacho, 58 F.3d 408, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor does the evidence cited by Bressi raise a triable issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the checkpoint’s operation. United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1993). 2. Summary judgment was also warranted on all claims relating …
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