United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 18-3011 ___________________________ Tua Mene Lebie Bakor, lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner, v. William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States, lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent. ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: October 16, 2019 Filed: May 7, 2020 ____________ Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. ____________ COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General may remove an alien “who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings under this provision against Tua Mene Lebie Bakor, an alien originally from Nigeria. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that Bakor had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude: Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth Degree in Minnesota, and knowing failure to comply with Minnesota’s sex offender registration statute. Bakor argues that neither of these convictions qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. We deny the petition for review. I. Bakor was admitted to the United States as a refugee in September 1999. Approximately three years later, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001, he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fifth Degree. Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subdiv. 1. As a result of this conviction, Bakor was obliged to comply with Minnesota’s sex offender registration law. In 2015, Bakor failed to comply, and he pleaded guilty to a knowing failure to adhere to registration requirements. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subdiv. 5(a). In 2017, the Department initiated removal proceedings against Bakor, alleging that he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The immigration court sustained the charge and ordered the Department to remove Bakor to Nigeria. Bakor appealed the removal order to the Board, arguing through counsel that neither of his previous convictions was for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board, in a decision by a single member, rejected the argument and dismissed the appeal. -2- II. Congress did not define the ambiguous phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.” In reviewing a decision in which the Board relies on a published opinion that interprets the statute, we generally accord deference to the agency’s interpretation and uphold its construction as long as it is reasonable. Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 811 (8th Cir. 2004); see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 908-12 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Where the Board’s decision comes entirely in an unpublished ruling by a single member, we defer to the ruling insofar as it is persuasive under the rubric of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). We have not resolved whether a single-member decision, standing alone, is afforded the same level of deference as a published decision under Aguirre-Aguirre and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ...
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