NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TZILACATZIN OREGON-REYNOSO, No. 20-73505 Petitioner, Agency No. A091-868-847 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 9, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, IKUTA, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Tzilacatzin Oregon-Reynoso petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his claims for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.1 “Whether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ [(“PSG”)] … is a question of law,” which this Court reviews de novo. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010). In contrast, this Court reviews whether a petitioner has shown that his persecutor was or would be motivated by a protected ground—i.e., whether the “nexus” requirement has been satisfied—under the substantial evidence standard. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this deferential standard, we treat factual findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, in order to reverse the BIA’s finding under substantial evidence review, “we must find that the evidence not only supports [such a] conclusion, but compels it.”2 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). Here, the record does not compel us to reverse the agency. Oregon-Reynoso 1 The parties are familiar with the facts, so we repeat them here only as necessary. 2 “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018); Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In so doing, we review … the reasons explicitly identified by the BIA, and then examine the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in support of those reasons.”). “Thus, we refer to the [BIA] and IJ collectively as ‘the agency.’” Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 claims that he suffered past persecution in March of 2014 when three unarmed members of the Tepito organization assaulted him in his store after he refused to pay the extortion fee they demanded. After the assault, Oregon-Reynoso required stitches, decided to leave Mexico, and re-entered the United States without authorization a few days later. Regarding his withholding of removal claim, Oregon-Reynoso bore the burden of showing that if removed to …
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