UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-4173 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHRISTIAN GEOVANY GUARDADO-DIAZ, a/k/a Christian Diaz, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:16-cr-00214-GJH-1) Submitted: May 21, 2018 Decided: June 5, 2018 Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Baltimore, Maryland, Joanna Silver, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland; Christopher B. Leach, Monica L. Haymond, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Stephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, David I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland; Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Trevor N. McFadden, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John M. Pellettieri, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Christian Geovany Guardado-Diaz of unlawful reentry after removal following a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Guardado-Diaz to a sentence of time served, followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal, he raises various challenges to his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm. Guardado-Diaz first challenges the district court’s denial of his 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012) motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Guardado-Diaz failed to show that the entry of his underlying 1997 removal order was fundamentally unfair. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). He contends that during his deportation hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) omitted certain key benefits of voluntary departure—a form of discretionary relief—and misstated that in order to qualify for such relief, Guardado-Diaz was required to secure funds in a short period of time to leave the country. Guardado-Diaz claims that, rather than being deported, he would have sought voluntary departure had he been sufficiently informed of the attendant benefits and eligibility requirements. In considering the district court’s ruling on a § 1326(d) motion to dismiss an indictment, “we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 628 (2017). In a prosecution for illegal reentry following an order of removal, a defendant may collaterally attack the removal order that constitutes an element of the offense if he can show, in part, that “the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3); see Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d at 458. “To 3 demonstrate fundamental unfairness in the entry of the removal order, a defendant must show that (1) his due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects.” Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we were to assume that the failure to sufficiently inform a defendant of discretionary relief at ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals