UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4281 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. FILY GIOVANY AMAYA-MARTINEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:18-cr-00413-LO-1) Submitted: October 31, 2019 Decided: November 12, 2019 Before MOTZ and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Geremy C. Kamen, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Cadence A. Mertz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachery Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Aidan Taft Grano, Assistant United States Attorney, Jordy Hur, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Fily Giovany Amaya-Martinez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted following a bench trial of one count of illegal reentry after removal following an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). He was sentenced to a term of one year and one day of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. In light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Amaya-Martinez argues that he is legally innocent of his conviction because the agency lacked jurisdiction over his initial removal proceedings, rendering them void. We review legal issues de novo. United States v. Peoples, 698 F.3d 185, 189 (4th Cir. 2012). In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a notice to appear (NTA) that does not designate the specific time and place for the first hearing “is not a ‘notice to appear under [8 U.S.C. §] 1229(a) [(2012)]’” and does not terminate the alien’s period of continuous presence for purposes of cancellation of removal. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110, 2114 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (2012)). The Supreme Court stated that it was addressing a “narrow question[:] . . . If the Government serves a noncitizen with a document that is labeled ‘notice to appear,’ but the document fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the stop- time rule?” Id. at 2110. The Court answered the question in the negative, noting that, according to statute, the relevant period of continuous presence terminates “‘when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)). 2 Citing § 1229(a), Amaya-Martinez argues that, following Pereira, the NTA that initiated his removal proceeding was invalid because it lacked a time and date to appear. (Appellant’s Br. at 6, 9-14). He therefore concludes that his “initial removal proceeding was void.” (Id. at 14). We recently held in United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2019), however, that “[i]t is the regulatory definition of ‘notice to appear,’ and not § 1229(a)’s definition, that controls ...
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