Case: 16-20700 Document: 00514940245 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/02/2019 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED No. 16-20700 May 2, 2019 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. HECTOR PARRALES-GUZMAN, also known as Hector Guzman Parrales, also known as Hector Guzman Perales, also known as Hector Parrales Guzman, also known as Hector Perales-Guzman, also known as Hector Parrales, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge: In 2001, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered Hector Parrales-Guzman removed based on his felony conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) under Texas law. The IJ determined that Parrales-Guzman was removable because his DWI conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which included “crime[s] of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16. Parrales-Guzman neither requested relief from removal nor appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In fact, as reflected Case: 16-20700 Document: 00514940245 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/02/2019 No. 16-20700 on the IJ’s removal order, Parrales-Guzman waived his right to appeal the removal order to the BIA. Subsequent to his removal, Parrales-Guzman returned to the United States and was removed twice more in August 2010 and April 2011. In June 2014, when Parrales-Guzman was found yet again in the United States, the government obtained an indictment against him for illegal re-entry after conviction of a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Parrales-Guzman moved to dismiss his indictment claiming that his 2001 removal order was invalid. His main thrust was that the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague. The government opposed the motion to dismiss indictment on two grounds. First, the government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) barred Parrales-Guzman’s attempt to collaterally attack his 2001 removal order. Second, the government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) was not unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that under then-controlling Fifth Circuit law, the definition of “crime of violence” in § 16(b) was not unconstitutionally vague and denied Parrales-Guzman’s motion to dismiss the indictment. See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016), abrogated by Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). However, the district court did not rely on the government’s § 1326(d) argument. Following a bench trial, the district court found Parrales-Guzman guilty and sentenced him to time served and two years of supervised release. Although we affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Parrales-Guzman’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Dimaya. In his supplemental brief, Parrales-Guzman argues that we should remand to the district court so that it can consider his ...
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