PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 19-2989 ________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEFFREY BOYD, Appellant ________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 4-18-cr-00281-001) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann ________________ Argued on September 23, 2020 Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 28, 2021) Heidi R. Freese Frederick W. Ulrich (Argued) Tammy L. Taylor Office of Federal Public Defender 100 Chestnut Street Suite 306 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellant David J. Freed Michelle L. Olshefski (Argued) Office of United States Attorney 235 North Washington Avenue P.O. Box 309, Suite 311 Scranton, PA 18503 Counsel for Appellee ________________ OPINION OF THE COURT ________________ AMBRO, Circuit Judge A state court in Oklahoma ordered Jeffrey Boyd to stay away from his ex-wife and his son, surrender his firearms, and undergo a mental health evaluation. After his arrest in Pennsylvania with a loaded handgun, a jury convicted Boyd of possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He 2 appeals, contending (1) his trial was tainted by (a) improper jury instructions, (b) unduly prejudicial evidence, and (c) prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) the firearm prohibition violates his Second Amendment right of gun possession. We conclude that any trial errors were harmless and that Congress can constitutionally disarm those subject to certain protective orders, including Boyd. We thus affirm his conviction. Just months after Boyd’s trial, the Supreme Court issued Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), a decision on the proof required for a conviction under § 922(g). After Rehaif, the Government must show not only that a defendant was subject to a qualifying protective order at the time he possessed a gun, but also that he knew about the protective order. The District Court had not instructed the jury on this knowledge element, and Boyd now claims this error entitles him to a new trial. But we will not order a new trial when an error is harmless, and here the trial record contains overwhelming evidence of Boyd’s knowledge, including his own admissions in a letter to the state court. Next, Boyd argues the District Court erred by admitting into evidence statements that he made about harming then- President Trump’s family. Given the limited scope of facts needed to prove a violation of § 922(g)(8), we are concerned by the decision to admit this clearly prejudicial evidence. Nonetheless, introduction of the statements did not contribute to the verdict, leaving any error harmless. Third, Boyd points to repeated statements in the prosecution’s closing argument that accused the defense of “misleading” the jury, hence alleging they amount to prosecutorial misconduct worthy of a mistrial. Without 3 opining on the appropriateness of these statements, we conclude that the context, jury instructions, and weight of the evidence make any error harmless. Finally, Boyd contends § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him …
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