USCA11 Case: 19-12858 Date Filed: 05/19/2021 Page: 1 of 19 [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 19-12858 ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00003-WPD-14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JULIUS STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________ (May 19, 2021) Before LAGOA, ANDERSON, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. LAGOA, Circuit Judge: Julius Stevens appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115- USCA11 Case: 19-12858 Date Filed: 05/19/2021 Page: 2 of 19 391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. On appeal, Stevens argues that (1) the district court erred in finding that he was ineligible under the First Step Act, and (2) the district court abused its discretion in determining that, even if the First Step Act applied, it would exercise its discretion and deny him a sentence reduction.1 On appeal, the government concedes that Stevens was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. We agree. Notwithstanding the government’s concession, we must still decide whether the district court, in its alternative holding, abused its discretion in denying Stevens’s motion for a sentence reduction, and in so doing we must answer the question this Court left open in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020)—whether consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors is mandatory for a district court exercising its discretion in granting or denying a sentence reduction under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. We hold that the First 1 As an initial matter, Stevens’s term of imprisonment expired before he filed the motion for a sentence reduction at issue in this appeal, and Stevens is now serving the supervised release portion of his sentence. Before the district court, Stevens argued that both his term of imprisonment and his term of supervised release should be reduced. On appeal, however, Stevens properly argues only for a reduction or termination of his term of supervised release. A challenge to an imposed term of imprisonment is moot once that term has expired, see United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011); United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2014), but where a defendant is still serving other aspects of his sentence, e.g., paying a fine or serving a term of supervised release, any appeal related to that aspect of his sentence is not moot, see Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Dawson is still serving his term of supervised release, which is part of his sentence and involves some restrictions upon his liberty. Because success for Dawson could alter the supervised release portion of his sentence, his appeal is not moot.”). This appeal, therefore, relates solely to Stevens’s term of supervised release. 2 USCA11 Case: 19-12858 Date Filed: 05/19/2021 Page: 3 of 19 Step Act …
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals