NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted June 29, 2018 Decided July 20, 2018 Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge No. 17‐2619 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 16 CR 838‐1 PEDRO ORTEGA‐CERVANTES, a.k.a. “Pedro Ortega‐Bey” Sharon Johnson Coleman, Defendant‐Appellant. Judge. O R D E R Pedro Ortega‐Cervantes, to whom we refer as “Ortega‐Bey” as he now prefers, was removed from the United States in 2005 after his lawful permanent resident status was revoked as a result of his conviction for a drug crime. He returned to the United States, however, and was arrested in Cook County in 2014. He was then indicted for unlawfully reentering the country without applying for readmission, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). His case proceeded to a bench trial, at which he defended himself on the ground that his removal had been invalid because he is a member of Moorish Science Temple of America. No. 17‐2619 Page 2 Ortega‐Bey insisted on representing himself at his arraignment and beyond so that he could argue that, as a Moor, he was an original inhabitant of the land and could not be deported or prosecuted by the United States government. Over Ortega‐Bey’s objection, Judge Coleman appointed standby counsel. At the bench trial, the government presented several witnesses. Ortega‐Bey cross‐examined the first two, as did standby counsel. The government then objected to the hybrid representation. From then on, the judge asked Ortega‐Bey if he wished to have standby counsel perform the cross‐examinations; he said yes for the remaining four witnesses. Ortega‐Bey did not testify, nor did he present any evidence. The judge ultimately found that the government had met its burden to show that Ortega‐Bey was guilty of illegal reentry. The sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines was 33 to 41 months; the judge chose a sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release with very few conditions. Ortega‐Bey appealed. Appellate counsel moves to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Ortega‐Bey did not respond to counsel’s motion. See Cir. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). First, counsel contemplates whether he could argue that Ortega‐Bey did not knowingly waive his right to counsel. But Ortega‐Bey stated his intent to proceed pro se at his arraignment, detention hearing, pre‐trial hearing, and when standby counsel was appointed. Magistrate Judge Finnegan and Judge Coleman repeatedly informed ...
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