CORRECTED COPY UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Before ALDYKIEWICZ, SALUSSOLIA, and WALKER Appellate Military Judges UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Second Lieutenant JOSEPH L. BROWN United States Army, Appellant ARMY 20180316 United States Army Combined Arms Support Command Andrew J. Glass, Military Judge Colonel James D. Levine II, Staff Judge Advocate For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany D. Pond, JA; Captain Benjamin A. Accinelli, JA; Captain Zachary A. Gray, JA (on brief). For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Wayne H. Williams, JA; Major Dustin B. Myrie, JA; Major Anne Savin, JA (on brief). 29 May 2020 --------------------------------- MEMORANDUM OPINION --------------------------------- This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent. SALUSSOLIA, Judge: We review this case under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 [UCMJ]. On appeal, appellant asserts two assignments of error: (1) whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when he was advised that his pending Resignation For the Good of the Service (RFGOS) could still be approved if he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to be dismissed; and (2) whether appellant’s guilty plea was improvident because he did not understand the consequences of his pleas and pretrial agreement. These alleged errors merit discussion, but no relief pursuant to appellant’s arguments. We grant relief in our decretal paragraph pursuant to this court’s reasoning in United States v. Vance, BROWN—ARMY 20180316 ARMY 20180011, 2020 CCA LEXIS 112 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 8 Apr. 2020) (mem. op.). BACKGROUND Appellant commissioned into the Army from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) and incurred a service obligation as a result of the college scholarship he received. On 9 November 2017—long before he completed his initial service obligation—appellant was apprehended for shoplifting from various on-post stores at Fort Lee, Virginia. On 26 February 2018, the government preferred charges against appellant. On 1 March 2018, appellant submitted a RFGOS pursuant to Army Reg. 600-8-24, Personnel-General: Officer Transfers and Discharges, para. 3-13 (12 Apr. 2008; Rapid Action Revision 13 September 2011) [AR 600-8-24]. Appellant’s chain of command, including the General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) recommended disapproval of the RFGOS. On 28 March 2018, appellant’s military defense counsel submitted a delay request asking that the GCMCA not refer charges to a general court-martial “for ninety (90) days or before the Secretary of the Army or its delegate acts on the [RFGOS]. . . .” The request explained appellant’s RFGOS had been submitted on 1 March and was still pending a decision. The GCMCA effectively denied this request by referring the charges to a general court-martial on 4 April 2018. On 24 April, appellant was arraigned by the military judge who scheduled the court-martial for 4 June 2018. Appellant submitted an offer to plead guilty on 27 April 2018. 1 On 4 June 2018, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, consistent with his pleas, of three specifications of larceny and one specification of obstruction of justice, in violation of Articles ...
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