Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/23/2021 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED December 23, 2021 No. 20-60446 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Claudia Vasquez-Rosales, Petitioner, versus Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A208 997 328 Before Barksdale, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Claudia Vasquez-Rosales, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal. Vasquez contends the BIA erroneously concluded: * Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/23/2021 No. 20-60446 the harm she suffered did not constitute persecution; and she failed to establish she was, or would be, harmed because of membership in her asserted particular social group (PSG; one of three claimed to the IJ)— members of the Vasquez family. (She does not challenge, and has therefore abandoned, the BIA’s conclusion she is ineligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting unbriefed challenges considered abandoned).) In considering the BIA’s decision (and the IJ’s decision, to the extent it influenced the BIA), legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; factual findings, for substantial evidence. Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). Under the substantial-evidence standard, reversal is improper unless “the evidence compels it”. Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). To qualify for asylum, applicant must establish, inter alia, either “past persecution”, or a “well-founded fear of future persecution”, based on one of five enumerated grounds, including membership in a particular social group. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (establishing asylum eligibility); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining refugee), 1158(b)(1) (listing conditions for granting asylum). To qualify for withholding of removal, “applicant must demonstrate a clear probability of persecution upon return”. Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Withholding of removal is a higher standard than asylum”. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, an applicant who fails to meet the asylum standard cannot meet the withholding-of-removal standard. Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Vasquez did not suffer past persecution because the three threats she received: occurred over a short period of time; were not accompanied by physical violence; and 2 Case: 20-60446 Document: 00516144023 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/23/2021 No. 20-60446 stopped after she moved to another part of the country. See Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting asylum requires petitioner to demonstrate “systematic, sustained pattern of assaults or other acts of oppression—not individual …
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