Case: 16-15737 Date Filed: 05/22/2019 Page: 1 of 42 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 16-15737 ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-02095-WCO VERONZA L. BOWERS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, WARDEN, Respondents-Appellees. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________ (May 22, 2019) Case: 16-15737 Date Filed: 05/22/2019 Page: 2 of 42 Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER, ∗ District Judge. JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Veronza Bowers was convicted in 1974 for the murder of a federal park ranger, and he has been incarcerated ever since. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to parole, given how much time he has served on his sentence. Petitioner’s right to any parole is governed by the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq. (the “Parole Act” or the “Act”), under which he became eligible to be considered for “mandatory” 1 parole in April 2004. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Since that time, the United States Parole Commission has repeatedly denied Petitioner’s requests for release under § 4206(d), finding that he is ineligible for this type of parole because he seriously violated institutional rules. This appeal arises from his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of Georgia. In the district court, Petitioner alleged that the ∗ The Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. 1 Although the applicable provision is often referred to as the “mandatory parole” provision, in fact the provision is not mandatory, and the Commission can deny parole under this provision under one of three circumstances: if the prisoner has (1) seriously or (2) frequently violated institution rules or (3) if there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner will commit another crime in the future. 2 Case: 16-15737 Date Filed: 05/22/2019 Page: 3 of 42 Commission erred in denying his parole for two reasons: first, by applying an erroneous interpretation of the Parole Act’s mandatory parole provision, § 4206(d), and second, by denying his parole in response to improper political pressure, thus failing to act as a neutral, unbiased decision-maker in considering his right to parole. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief. Petitioner now appeals. After careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, we AFFIRM. I. BACKGROUND The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required federal defendants to be sentenced pursuant to federal Sentencing Guidelines and it eliminated any early release from a sentence pursuant to parole. See Pub. L. 98–473, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 1837, 2027, 2031 (1984); Walden v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 1997). Prior to enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, the 1976 Parole Act defined the circumstances under which individuals serving prison sentences may become eligible for parole. Notwithstanding its repeal, the Parole Act continues to apply to prisoners who were sentenced prior to ...
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