NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT VICTOR ANDRACA-ROMERO, No. 18-70928 Petitioner, Agency No. A070-168-295 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 8, 2019** Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District Judge. Petitioner Victor Andraca-Romero is a Mexican national who seeks review of a final order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. denial of his application for withholding of removal. We deny his petition for review. We review the BIA’s decisions regarding eligibility for withholding of removal under the substantial evidence standard. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Applying this highly deferential standard of review, “we may reverse only if the evidence in the record compels a contrary result.” Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2009). We review de novo claims that a petitioner’s due process rights were violated. Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). A decision should be reversed on due process grounds only if the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the record does not compel us to conclude that the agency erred in denying Andraca-Romero’s application for withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports the conclusions of both the immigration judge (“IJ”) and the BIA that Andraca-Romero was not targeted by the cartel in the past because of his or his mother’s political activities, but rather because they wanted money from him, which is not a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that noncitizen’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Substantial evidence therefore supports the conclusion 2 that he has not established a clear probability of past or future persecution based on a protected ground. Although Andraca-Romero separately argued his family-based particular social group claim before the IJ, he did not raise it in his appeal to the BIA. This claim is therefore unexhausted. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The petitioner’s failure to raise an issue to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust, depriving this court of jurisdiction.”). We accordingly decline to reach Andraca-Romero’s challenge to the BIA’s decision in In re L-E-A, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 2017), which set the standard for persecution claims based on ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals