Filed 2/24/22 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ANNA VON HERRMANN, D079157 Petitioner, v. (Imperial County Super. Ct. No. ECU001031) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF IMPERIAL COUNTY, Respondent; MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION, Real Party in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. L. Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Petition granted. Law Office of Abenicio Cisneros and Abenicio Cisneros for Petitioner. Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Susan E. Coleman and Mark J. Austin for Real Party in Interest. No appearance for Respondent. The California Public Records Act (CPRA) generally applies only to government agencies. (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) However, with respect to facilities that detain noncitizens as they await federal civil immigration proceedings, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1670.9, which provides (in part) that “[a]ny facility that detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city” is subject to the CPRA. (Civ. Code, § 1670.9, subd. (c).)1 We consider here whether, under section 1670.9(c), the CPRA applies to a private entity that operates an immigration detention facility, even when the operator is not a direct party “to a contract with a city.” (§ 1670.9(c).) The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility’s owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE’s approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator). Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann (Petitioner) served the Operator with a CPRA request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that “detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city.” (§ 1670.9(c), italics added.) Alternatively, Operator maintained several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator’s interpretation of section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator’s CPRA exemption claims. 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. We will refer to section 1670.9, subdivision (c) as “section 1670.9(c),” and will sometimes refer to a “facility that detains a noncitizen” (§ 1670.9(c)) as an “immigration detention facility.” 2 Petitioner contends the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. We agree. As we will explain, the plain meaning of section 1670.9(c), and the structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis. Accordingly, we will issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to …
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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals