Walter Espinoza Orellana v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 26 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WALTER AMILCAR ESPINOZA No. 18-71606 ORELLANA, Agency No. A206-272-122 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 22, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: BERZON, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. Walter Amilcar Espinoza Orellana (“Espinoza Orellana”)—a native and citizen of El Salvador—petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Espinoza * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Orellana’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition. Where the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994), “and also provides its own review of the evidence and law,” the court reviews the decisions of both the IJ and BIA. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 664 (2020). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011), and its factual findings for substantial evidence, Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence review requires us to uphold the agency’s factual findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” See Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)), overruled on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Espinoza Orellana applied for relief after May 11, 2005, therefore the REAL ID Act’s standards regarding adverse credibility findings guide our review. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). Under the Act, credibility findings need not go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). “‘[I]n assessing an adverse credibility finding under the [REAL ID] Act, we must look to the ‘totality of the 2 circumstances[ ] and all relevant factors.’” Alam, 11 F.4th at 1137 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). At his merits hearing, Espinoza Orellana testified to three incidents of persecution by a gang of supporters of a rival political party. Espinoza Orellana testified that rivals came to his home three times in about one week and demanded his voting credentials with threats of harm. He refused, and they did not harm him, though one rival reached through a fence and tried to grab him. Espinoza Orellana also testified that in 2010 his brother was murdered because of similar political beliefs and in 2014 his brother-in-law was also murdered for these beliefs. The IJ …

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