NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: May 16, 2023 S23A0264. WARD v. MEDINA. PETERSON, Presiding Justice. A habeas court granted relief to Jonathon Medina on the grounds that his guilty plea was involuntary and trial counsel was ineffective. The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, Timothy Ward,1 appeals the habeas court’s order, challenging each of those grounds. Because we conclude that the habeas court did not err in granting relief to Medina on his involuntary-plea claim, we affirm the habeas court’s decision on that ground without addressing that court’s rulings on Medina’s ineffective assistance claims. 1. The record of the underlying proceedings. The correctional facility that maintains custody of Medina is a private 1 company and the warden of that facility is an employee of that company. Commissioner Ward intervened as a party respondent in the case. (a) The plea In October 2016, Medina was charged with five counts of armed robbery for one robbery involving five different victims (Counts 1-5), as well as five counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against those victims (Counts 6-10). Medina proceeded to trial in March 2017. Just before the start of trial, the trial court held a hearing on Medina’s motion to suppress. When that motion was denied, trial counsel and Medina discussed the possibility of pleading guilty. After the jury was selected and opening statements were given, Medina informed the trial court that he and the State had entered into a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to all of the charged counts in exchange for the State withdrawing its recidivism notice. The trial court and the prosecutor had the following discussion about the sentencing range: Prosecutor: As to each Armed Robbery, the maximum is life in prison, with five of them, it’s five lifes; 20 years each for Aggravated Assault, there’s five of them, that’s 100 2 years. So, it’s — Court: It’s what or life? Prosecutor: Ten to twenty, or life. Court: Ten to twenty, or life. Prosecutor: Or, one to twenty on the Armed Robberies, which would be — the maximum would be five lifes, plus 100 years. The prosecutor corrected himself, noting that the stated sentencing range of “one to twenty” referred to the aggravated assault counts. When asked, the prosecutor said that the aggravated assault counts would not merge into the corresponding armed robbery counts. Medina confirmed to the court that he understood that the State was not making a sentencing recommendation and that he would accept the sentence imposed. The prosecutor then proffered his opening …
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