NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WENBIN LIU, No. 18-73026 Petitioner, Agency No. A077-317-081 v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 10, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Wenbin Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s “denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence,” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), we deny the petition. 1. To qualify for asylum, Liu must show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Liu did not show past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution in China on account of his religion. Liu argues that his arrest, detention, assault, and release conditions show that he experienced past persecution in China. The record, however, does not compel that conclusion. See Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that under substantial evidence review, the agency’s determination can be reversed only where “the record compels” the conclusion that the requisite fear of persecution existed) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992)). Liu is correct that in deciding whether a finding of persecution is compelled, we look to the totality of the circumstances experienced by the petitioner. Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004). Liu’s past harm closely mirrors the past harm suffered by the petitioner in Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2006), where this court concluded “that the evidence [did] not compel a result 2 contrary to the BIA’s.” Gu, 545 F.3d at 1021. Here, as the BIA recognized, Liu was mistreated. But, because Liu is unable to meaningfully distinguish his arrest, detention, assault, and release conditions from the harms the petitioner suffered in Gu, the agency’s conclusion that Liu’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution is supported by substantial evidence. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967–68 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that comparing similar cases is “perhaps [the] best” way to answer the heavily fact-dependent question whether mistreatment rises to the level of persecution); see also Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. ...
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