NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 12 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT YOUNG HO PAK; et al., No. 15-70464 Petitioners, Agency Nos. A099-716-680 A099-716-681 v. A099-716-682 A099-716-683 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 9, 2018** Pasadena, California Before: IKUTA and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and GILLIAM,*** District Judge. Young Ho Pak and his family, all of whom are natives of North Korea and citizens of South Korea, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) as to both North Korea and South Korea. We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo. Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s credibility determinations, applying the standards created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the petition for review. 1. The agency did not err in determining that the Pak family is not eligible for asylum from North Korea due to their firm resettlement in South Korea. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. The Paks do not challenge the agency’s factual determination that they were granted citizenship in South Korea, which constitutes prima facie evidence of “firm resettlement.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.15; Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 973, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Rather, they argue that Section 302 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (“NKHRA”), 22 U.S.C. § 7842, precludes application of the “firm resettlement” doctrine altogether. But in Jang v. Lynch, we held that the NKHRA “does not affect the analysis of firm resettlement for a North Korean who flees to South Korea.” 812 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the 2 BIA properly rejected the Paks’ argument that the NKHRA precludes application of the firm-resettlement doctrine to their asylum application.1 2. As to the Paks’ claim for asylum from South Korea, under the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Specifically, the agency reasonably relied on Mr. Pak’s inconsistent written and oral testimony regarding the dates and duration of his detention in North Korea, the dates of his attendance at military college, and the country of birth listed on his B-2 visa application. See Shrestha, 590 ...
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