NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ZHEN WANG, No. 16-72784 Petitioner, Agency No. A089-999-198 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted September 12, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Zhen Wang seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision to affirm the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We grant his petition and remand for further proceedings. “Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, [this court’s] review is limited to the BIA’s * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Mairena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). We examine the BIA’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). 1. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on two inconsistencies. Substantial evidence does not support either inconsistency as a ground for an adverse credibility determination. First, the BIA explained that Wang “stated in his testimony and asylum application that he lived at #7 YunxhiaLi in Tianjin, from the time he was born in December 1980” but “the household registry submitted by the respondent indicates that his parents moved to that address in 1983 and that the respondent moved there in 1997.” The IJ’s question to Wang about the household registry – “Why does the household registry say otherwise?” – did not specify what the registry indicated or how it contradicted Wang’s testimony. Wang’s response, “[t]hat’s the address,” indicates that he thought the IJ asked why the household registry had a different address, not why it showed a different time period, than his application. That interpretation of the IJ’s question was entirely understandable, as the IJ’s preceding 2 recitation of what was in the application included the address. As there were no follow-up questions, Wang was not given an adequate opportunity to explain the apparent date discrepancy, and the BIA should not have relied on it. See, e.g., Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the IJ’s failure to further question an applicant resulted in the court speculating whether the applicant did not understand the question and whether there was an explanation for the inconsistency). See also Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) ...
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