NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 22-1268 _____________ DIANA ARON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A099-191-966) Immigration Judge: Ramin Rastegar _______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) December 7, 2022 Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. (Filed: December 27, 2022) _______________ OPINION _______________ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. MATEY, Circuit Judge. Diana Aron, also referred to as Diana Shvartsman, challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision vacating the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) grant of her applications for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. But we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decisions, so we must dismiss her petition. I. Petitioner, a native of the former Soviet Union and a citizen of Israel, was lawfully admitted to the United States in 2002. But she remained after her visa expired, claiming she needed ongoing medical care. Petitioner also participated in a scheme to procure diamonds on consignment without paying for them. That led to an indictment and Petitioner later pleading guilty to mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, resulting in a 78-month sentence and a $1.7 million restitution order. Upon Petitioner’s release from prison in 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings, charging her with removability for overstaying her visa, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and for her criminal convictions, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). She conceded removability under both charges and sought an adjustment of status along with a waiver of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Following a hearing, an IJ granted both applications. But the BIA vacated the IJ’s decision based on 2 Petitioner’s “significant, serious criminal history.” A.R. 3–5.1 She now petitions for review.2 II. We generally have jurisdiction to review “final order[s] of removal” entered by the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). But our authority is limited by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which precludes us from reviewing adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We also lack jurisdiction over final orders of removal entered against an alien removable for having committed an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). So Petitioner relies on the narrow exception that allows us to review constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Petitioner asks this Court to review the substance of the BIA’s decision vacating the 1 The IJ conducted removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10 and 1003.14(a). The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 2 Petitioner and the Government acknowledge that the BIA never explicitly ordered Petitioner removed. A final administrative order “must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” and “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal …
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