In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 18-1799 ELISEO BELTRAN-AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A089-856-143 ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 2, 2019 ____________________ Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Eliseo Beltran-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied for cancellation of removal from the United States. An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial on the ground that Beltran-Aguilar’s conviction for Wisconsin battery involving domestic abuse was a crime of domestic vi- olence. Beltran-Aguilar now petitions this court for review, 2 No. 18-1799 arguing that the Wisconsin offense is not categorically a crime of violence. It is, so we deny his petition. Federal law makes an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal if he has been convicted of a crime of domestic vio- lence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), which is “any crime of vi- olence … against a person committed by” a current or former domestic partner, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). A “crime of vio- lence” is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Offenses either cate- gorically involve physical force or they don’t; the elements of the crime for which a defendant was convicted, not his under- lying conduct, are what matters. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004). Beltran-Aguilar was convicted of battery under Wisconsin Statute 940.19(1), which prohibits “caus[ing] bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed.” In Wisconsin, “bodily harm” means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Wis. Stat. § 939.22(4). Beltran-Aguilar argues that Wisconsin battery is not a crime of violence because it can be satisfied by causing only illness or impairment of physical condition, which he says do not necessarily require physical force. Prec- edent says otherwise. The Supreme Court held in Curtis Johnson v. United States that “‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capa- ble of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Though the Court was interpreting a dif- ferent statute—18 U.S.C. § 924(e)—than the one at issue here, we’ve confirmed that “[t]he definition of a crime of violence No. 18-1799 3 in § 924(e) mirrors the language found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and the statutes are interpreted in the same way.” De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2011). We have already held that Wisconsin’s definition of bodily harm “tracks what Curtis Johnson said would suffice.” Yates v. United States, 842 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Wisconsin offense of battery by a prisoner is ...
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