NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 22 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FOUER ABDALLAH FRAIHAT, AKA No. 18-71187 Kamon Abdun Fryhaat, Agency No. A093-167-376 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 13, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: FERNANDEZ, M. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Fouer Abdallah Fraihat seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the immigration judge’s determinations that (1) Fraihat committed aggravated felonies and particularly serious crimes, and (2) Fraihat did not demonstrate that he was entitled to deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Because the agency ordered Fraihat’s removal on * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. the ground that he committed an aggravated felony, our review is limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). We dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction, and otherwise deny the petition. 1. Fraihat challenges the agency’s determinations that his 2001 conviction under California Health & Safety Code § 11379.6(a) is an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime. Because we “do not have jurisdiction to review unexhausted claims,” we dismiss Fraihat’s challenge for lack of jurisdiction. Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2013). Fraihat’s briefing to the Board did not address whether the section 11379.6(a) conviction is an aggravated felony. Moreover, he conceded that the section 11379.6(a) conviction “appears” to be a “per se particularly serious crime.” The Board was “entitled to look to [Fraihat’s] brief for an explication” of which issues he was challenging. Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2019). Because Fraihat did not challenge the immigration judge’s finding, the Board correctly concluded that “on appeal, those issues [were] waived.” The Board’s reference to Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), does not change our analysis. Generally, “when the BIA cites Burbano in its decision, all issues presented before the IJ are deemed to have been presented to the BIA.” Arreguin-Moreno v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2008). But 2 a Burbano citation does not always mean that the Board adopted and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision in full. Instead, “the BIA can and should specifically state that it is . . . limiting its opinion” if it adopts and affirms only some parts of an immigration judge’s decision. Abebe v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because the Board specifically concluded that Fraihat waived his challenges to the section 11379.6(a) conviction and the Board did not otherwise address those arguments on the merits, Fraihat did not exhaust his claims. We are similarly unconvinced that any intervening changes in law excuse Fraihat’s failure to exhaust. We “do not require an alien to exhaust administrative remedies on legal issues based on events ...
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