(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus KANSAS v. GLOVER CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS No. 18–556. Argued November 4, 2019—Decided April 6, 2020 A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, dis- covering that the truck belonged to respondent Glover and that Glover’s driver’s license had been revoked. The deputy pulled the truck over because he assumed that Glover was driving. Glover was in fact driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator. He moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion. The District Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kansas Supreme Court in turn reversed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Held: When the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner’s driver’s license has been revoked is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–10. (a) An officer may initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417. The level of suspicion re- quired is less than that necessary for probable cause and “depends on ‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea- sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” ’ ” Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402. Courts must therefore per- mit officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125. P. 3. (b) Here, the deputy’s commonsense inference that the owner of a vehicle was likely the vehicle’s driver provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. That inference is not made unreasonable merely because a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner or because Glover had a revoked license. Though common sense suffices 2 KANSAS v. GLOVER Syllabus to justify the officer’s inference, empirical studies demonstrate that drivers with suspended or revoked licenses frequently continue to drive. And Kansas’ license-revocation scheme, which covers drivers who have already demonstrated a disregard for the law or are categor- ically unfit to drive, reinforces the reasonableness of the inference that an individual with a revoked license will continue to drive. Pp. 4–6. (c) Glover’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. He argues that the deputy’s inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in his law ...
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