17-313 Tai v. Sessions BIA A079 141 088 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of July, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ ZOU ZONG TAI, AKA ZONG TAI ZOU, Petitioner, v. 17-313 NAC JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Jay Ho Lee, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Matthew B. George, Benjamin Mark Moss, Trial Attorneys, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Zou Zong Tai, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 11, 2017, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen as untimely. In re Zou Zong Tai, No. A079 141 088 (B.I.A. Jan. 11, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). It is undisputed that Tai’s 2016 motion to reopen was untimely because it was filed more than nine years after his removal order became final in 2007. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Ineffective assistance of counsel may equitably toll the time limitation on a motion to reopen if the movant has exercised “due diligence” in pursuing the claim. See Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2008). The movant “is required to exercise due diligence both 2 before and after he has or should have discovered ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 132. “[T]here is no period of time which . . . is per se unreasonable, and, therefore, disqualifies a petitioner from equitable tolling–or, for that matter, any period of time that is per se reasonable.” Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 2007). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Tai failed to establish due diligence throughout the ...
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